Such cases include abortion after rape and abortion during the first fourteen days after conception when there is an argument that the fetus is not definitely an individual. Another reason for making these exceptions allow for those cases in which the permissibility of abortion is compatible with the argument of this essay. Such cases include abortion when continuation of a pregnancy endangers a woman's life and when the fetus is anencephalic.
When I wrongness of abortion in this essay, a reader she presume the above qualifications. I mean by an abort ion an action intended to bring about the death of a fetus for the sake of the woman who carries it. Thus, as is standard on the literature on this subject, I eliminanate spontaneous abortions from consideration.
I mean by a fetus a developing human being from. Thus, as is standard, I call embryos and zygotes, fetuses. The argument of this essay will establish that abortion is wrong for the same reason as killing a reader of this essay is wrong.
I shall just assume, rather than establish, that killing you is seriously wrong. I shall make no attempt to offer a complete ethics of killing.
Finally, I shall make no attempt to resolve some very fundamental and difficult general philosophical issues into which this analysis of the ethics of abortion might lead. Symmetries that emerge from the analysis of the major arguments on either side of the abortion debate may explain why the abortion debate seems intractable. Consider the following standard anti-abortion argument: Fetuses are both human and alive. Humans have the right to life.
Therefore, fetuses have the right to life. Of course, women have the right to control their own bodies, but the right to life overrides the right of a woman to control her own body. Therefore, abortion is wrong. Judith Thomson has argued that even if one grants for the sake of argument only that fetuses have the right to life, this argument fails.
Thomson invites you to imagine that you have been connected while sleeping, bloodstream to bloodstream, to a famous violinist. The violinist, who suffers from a rare blood disease, will die if disconnected. Thomson argues that you surely have the right to disconnect yourself. She appeals to our intuition that having to lie in bed with a violinist for an indefinite period is too much for morality to demand.
She supports this claim by noting that the body being used is your body, not the violinist's body. She distinguishes the right to life, which the violinist clearly has, from the right to use someone else's body when necessary to preserve one's life, which it is not at all obvious the violinist has.
Because the case of pregnancy is like the case of the violinist, one is no more morally obligated to remain attached to a fetus than to remain attached to the violinist. It is widely conceded that one can generate from Thomson's vivid case the conclusion that abortion is morally permissible when a pregnancy is due to rape Warren, , p. But this is hardly a general right to abortion.
Do Thomson's more general theses generate a more general right to an abortion? Thomson draws our attention to the fact that in a pregnancy, although a fetus uses a woman's body as a life-support system, a pregnant woman does not use a fetus's body as a life-support system. However, an opponent of abortion might draw our attention to the fact that in an abortion the life that is lost is the fetus's, not the woman's.
This symmetry seems to leave us with a stand-off. Thomson points out that a fetus's right to life does not entail its right to use someone else's body to preserve its life. However, an opponent of abortion might point out that a woman's right to use her own body does not entail her right to end someone else's life in order to do what she wants with her body.
In reply, one might argue that a pregnant woman's right to control her own body doesn't come to much if it is wrong for her to take any action that ends the life of the fetus within her. However, an opponent of abortion can argue that the fetus's right to life doesn't come to much if a pregnant woman can end it when she chooses. The consequence of all of these symmetries seems to be a stand-off.
But if we have the stand-off, then one might argue that we are left with a conflict of rights: a fetal right to life versus the right of a woman to control her own body. One might then argue that the right to life seems to be a stronger right than the right to control one's own body in the case of abortion because the loss of one's life is a greater loss than the loss of the right to control one's own body in one respect for nine months. Therefore, the right to life overrides the right to control one's own body and abortion is wrong.
Considerations like these have suggested to both opponents of abortion and supporters of choice that a Thomsonian strategy for de-. In fairness, one must note that Thomson did not intend her strategy to generate a general moral permissibility of abortion.
The above considerations suggest that whether abortion is morally permissible boils down to the question of whether fetuses have the right to life. An argument that fetuses either have or lack the right to life must be based upon some general criterion for having or lacking the right to life. Opponents of abortion, on the one hand, look around for the broadest possible plausible criterion, so that fetuses will fall under it. This explains why classic arguments against abortion appeal to the criterion of being human Noonan, ; Beckwith, This criterion appears plausible: The claim that all humans, whatever their race, gender, religion or age, have the right to life seems evident enough.
In addition, because the fetuses we are concerned with do not, after all, belong to another species, they are clearly human. Thus, the syllogism that generates the conclusion that fetuses have the right to life is apparently sound.
On the other hand, those who believe abortion is morally permissible wish to find a narrow, but plausible, criterion for possession of the right to life so that fetuses will fall outside of it. This explains, in part, why the standard pro-choice arguments in the philosophical literature appeal to the criterion of being a person Feinberg, ; Tooley, ; Warren, ; Benn, ; Engelhardt, This criterion appears plausible: The claim that only persons have the right to life seems evident enough.
Thus, the syllogism needed to generate the conclusion that no fetus possesses the right to life is apparently sound.
Given that no fetus possesses the right to life, a woman's right to control her own body easily generates the general right to abortion. The existence of two apparently defensible syllogisms which support contrary conclusions helps to explain why partisans on both sides of the abortion dispute often regard their opponents as either morally depraved or mentally deficient.
Which syllogism should we reject? The anti-abortion syllogism is usually attacked by attacking its major premise: the claim that whatever is biologically human has the right to life. This premise is subject to scope problems because the class of the biologically human includes too much: human cancer-cell cultures are biologically human, but they do not have the right to life.
Moreover, this premise also is subject to moral-relevance problems: the connection between the biological and the moral is merely assumed. It is hard to think of a good argument for such a connection. If one wishes to consider the category of "human" a moral category, as some people find it plausible to do in other contexts, then one is left with no way of showing that the fetus is fully human without begging the question. Thus, the classic anti-abortion argument appears subject to fatal difficulties.
These difficulties with the classic anti-abortion argument are well known and thought by many to be conclusive. The symmetrical difficulties with the classic pro-choice syllogism are not as well recognized. The pro-choice syllogism can be attacked by attacking its major premise: Only persons have the right to life. This premise is subject to scope problems because the class of persons includes too little: infants, the severely retarded, and some of the mentally ill seem to fall outside the class of persons as the supporter of choice understands the concept.
The premise is also subject to moral-relevance problems:. Being a person is understood by the pro-choicer as having certain psychological attributes. If one wishes to consider "person" a moral category, as is often done, then one is left with no way of showing that the fetus is not a person without begging the question. Pro-choicers appear to have resources for dealing with their difficulties that opponents of abortion lack.
Consider their moral-relevance problem. A pro-. This is essentially Engelhardt's [] view. The great advantage of this contractarian approach to morality is that it seems far more plausible than any approach the anti-abortionist can provide. The great disadvantage of this contractarian approach to morality is that it adds to our earlier scope problems by leaving it unclear how we can have the duty not to inflict pain and suffering on animals.
Contractarians have tried to deal with their scope problems by arguing that duties to some individuals who are not persons can be justified even though those individuals are not contracting members of the moral community. For example, Kant argued that, although we do not have direct duties to animals, we "must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men" Kant, , p.
Feinberg argues that infanticide is wrong, not because infants have the right to life, but because our society's protection of infants has social utility. If we do not treat infants with tenderness and consideration, then when they are persons they will be worse off and we will be worse off also Feinberg, , p. These moves only stave off the difficulties with the pro-choice view; they do not resolve them. Consider Kant's account of our obligations to animals. Kantians certainly know the difference between persons and animals.
Therefore, no true Kantian would treat persons as she would treat animals. Thus, Kant's defense of our duties to animals fails to show that Kantians have a duty not to be cruel to animals. Consider Feinberg's attempt to show that infanticide is wrong even though no infant is a person.
That is quite compatible with killing the infants we intend to discard. This point can be supported by an analogy with which any pro-choicer will agree. There are plainly good reasons to treat with care and consideration the fetuses we intend to keep.
This is quite compatible with aborting those fetuses we intend to discard. Thus, Feinberg's account of the wrongness of infanticide is inadequate. If we conclude that abortion is not morally wrong, that doesn't mean that it's right to have an abortion; we need to ask whether having an abortion is the best thing or least bad thing to do in each particular case.
If we conclude that abortion is morally wrong, that doesn't mean that it's always impermissible to have an abortion; we need to ask whether having an abortion is less wrong than the alternatives. On one side are those who call themselves 'pro-life'.
They say that intentionally caused abortion is always wrong although it may on very rare occasions be the best thing to do. On the other side are those who call themselves 'pro-choice' or 'supporters of abortion rights', and who regard intentional abortion as acceptable in some circumstances.
People feel particularly strongly about abortion because there is no way of getting any opinion from the foetus - the potential 'victim' - about the issue as there is when considering euthanasia , and because the foetus can easily be portrayed as an entirely innocent and defenceless being.
The problems can be restated in terms of the sort of decisions that pregnant women and their doctors have to face:. If we follow this argument and accept that a foetus has a right to live, then we face part two of the problem:.
Search term:. Wade decision , opponents and supporters of abortion rights are still battling over the issue in court , at the ballot box and in state legislatures. Several states have introduced or passed new restrictions on abortion in with an eye toward giving the Supreme Court a chance to overturn its decision in Roe, and the high court agreed in May to review a Mississippi law that aims to make most abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy illegal.
Around six-in-ten U. Though abortion is a divisive issue, about six-in-ten U. While abortion has long divided political partisans, the partisan gap is now considerably wider than it was in the past. Attitudes about whether abortion should be legal vary widely by religious affiliation. Sizable minorities of Republicans and Democrats said in a survey that they did not agree with the dominant position on abortion policy of the party they identify with or lean toward.
Learn how to schedule an appointment for vaccination or testing. Read More. Education Research Patient Care. Student Resources Faculty Resources. More Search. Can't find what you're looking for? Pages No Results. Center for Health Ethics. Section Menu. Introduction Abortion is one of the most controversial issues of modern times. Pro-Life vs. Pro-Choice Abortion is the termination of a pregnancy.
Issues in the Abortion Dispute One way to see the abortion dispute is that opposing positions disagree because of differing perspectives on one or more key issues or factors: the moral status of the embryo or fetus the metaphysical and physical status of the embryo or fetus the moral rights of a person Moral status: The moral status of an entity is: Whether it deserves to be treated in a certain way.
Whether it can engage in right and wrong behavior. In summary, one way of looking at the relevance of the above issues to abortion is: The moral status of the embryo or fetus, unless overridden, might determine whether it was morally permissible to terminate the pregnancy.
The moral status of the embryo or fetus might derive from or be supported by the metaphysical or physical status or nature of the fetus. There might be other morally-relevant factors or considerations that would outweigh or override the moral status of the embryo or fetus and change the ethical judgment about the permissibility of abortion.
Implicit Lines of Reasoning Behind the Positions Unfortunately, due to the tremendous acrimony each camp feels toward the other, usually neither side attempts to understand the other. The simplest line of reasoning behind the pro-life position is something like the following: The embryo or fetus is a person Persons have a right to life Therefore the embryo or fetus has a right to life It is wrong to kill a being with a right to life Therefore it is wrong to kill an embryo or fetus.
Many variations on the above are possible. Sometimes the claim is not that the embryo or fetus is a person but that it is a human being.
Sometimes the belief is not that the embryo or fetus is a person but that it is a potential person. The assumption is that a potential person has actual rights, not just potential rights, and these include the right to life. Pro-lifers sometimes also believe that, except in cases of rape, the mother and father of the embryo or fetus should be held morally responsible for conceiving the child and bear the consequences of their actions.
Killing an innocent embryo or fetus is not a proper way to bear that responsibility. Some pro-lifers believe that in certain exceptional cases abortion is morally permissible. Such cases include situations where it is necessary to abort the fetus to save the life of the mother, or where it is highly likely the mother would die if the fetus were carried to term. Other more controversial cases involve incest and rape.
In such cases the interpretation would be that the fetus is not innocent or that the right to life of the fetus can be overridden or outweighed by these other factors or circumstances. An embryo or fetus is not a person. Therefore an embryo or fetus has no right to life. If a being has no right to life, it is not wrong to kill it. Therefore it is not wrong to kill an embryo or fetus. Overriding factors argument The right to life of any being may be overridden by other factors occurring.
An embryo or fetus may have a right to life Therefore any possible right to life of an embryo or fetus may be overridden by other factors occurring. Therefore it is not wrong to kill an embryo or fetus if certain factors occur. Considerations in Deciding on the Morality of Abortion One could argue that the first step in rational resolution of the abortion controversy should come from mutual understanding of the various positions.
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